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This essay does not claim to be about guoxue (Chinese national learn-ing); rather, it deals with what is called guoxue re or the guoxuemovement in contemporary China and the issues surrounding it. (1)
With no systematic training in ancient Chinese classics and Chinese philol-
ogy to qualify myself as an expert on guoxue itself – and I presume there
are not many in contemporary China or overseas qualified for the title – I
wish to speak to the symbolic or socio-ideological significance of the return
of guoxue in China when the social and cultural context for its formation
and practice is over, namely, the various uses that have been made of it.
Guoxue: The ambiguous legacy
Although there is no single universally acceptable definition of guoxue, the
term always seems to signal a certain definite spectral existence of some-
thing symbolic of China and traditional Chinese culture in the minds of those
who use it. As a concept with a fixed morphological form, guoxue has been
traversing history with a changing content, and to different people or social
groups it means different things. As uses of the past are always made to
serve the interests of the present and, as Croce has noted, all history is con-
temporary history, (2) I begin this essay with a number of questions as follows:
What is guoxue? When did the term begin to be used? Why do the Chinese
constantly invoke guoxue? What is the significance of the revival of guoxue
in contemporary China when capitalist globalisation is taking over in the
country as elsewhere in the world? How does it betray Chinese anxieties to-
wards their nation’s present and future? What is the symbolic meaning of
guoxue in contemporary China if, as a trope, it is oftentimes a catachresti-
cally floating signifier without a fixed semantic anchorage? How does the
ambiguity of guoxue as such reflect the ambiguity of Chinese modernity or
socialism with Chinese characteristics if the concept of guoxue is a product
of modernity? Is there some national subconscious underpinning the double
ambiguity?
Since its first appearance in 1902 when Liang Qichao (梁啟超) , one of
the universally acknowledged guoxue masters, used the term guoxue in his
correspondence with Huang Zunxian (黃遵憲), (3) guoxue both as a concept
and as a discipline of academic research has been subject to different in-
terpretations. According to Zhang Taiyan (章太炎), guoxue is a nation’s in-
digenous learning: “Guoxue is the founding source of a country, and in a
world dominated by rivalry, it is impossible for a nation to survive while its
indigenous learning is on the decline. To my best knowledge there have
been nations perishing with their inherent learning thriving on, and yet
there has been no record of nations surviving while their indigenous learn-
ing has been eliminated.” (4) In his Guoxue gailun (An Outline of Guoxue),
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Zhang breaks guoxue into three aspects or components, respectively
named jingxue de paibie (studies of six classics), zhexue de paibie (schools
of philosophy), and wenxue zhi paibie (trends and styles of literary writ-
ing). What is worth noting here is that in his discussion, guoxue with its
three components includes all that has been written or produced in China
over the past 4,000 years, literarily, philosophically, artistically, geographi-
cally, and even medically. (5)
Zhang’s definition of guoxue is echoed by Deng Shi (鄧實), writing a few
years later. In Deng’s view, guoxue “is what inherently pertains to a nation.
. . . Where there are nations there is national learning. National learning is
to be acquired to serve the nation’s interests and manage its affairs. The
birth of guoxue comes with the emergence of the nation; it is geographi-
cally differential and is rooted in the nation’s character. As such it cannot
be abandoned for a single moment.” (6) In Deng’s interpretation, guoxue
comes closest to what is called a nation’s entire traditional culture. Such
an inclusive definition of guoxue finds support in other world-renowned
scholars such as Liang Qichao and Hu Shi (胡適). In his recommended lists
of guoxue works motivated by his anxiety for younger generations to carry
on the nation’s past legacies, Liang included, in pretty much the same
manner, various kinds of Chinese writing ranging from Sishu wujing (four
books and five classics), Zhuzi baijia (Writings of pre-Qin philosophers) and
their study, philological works, poetry, and miscellaneous essays. (7) In his
estimate, “our indigenous learning” will never perish; instead, it will acquire
new life from the “true spirit of foreign learning” spreading far and wide in
China, as long as “the transmitters and translators of foreign learning are
well versed in guoxue.” (8) The over-inclusiveness of Hu Shi’s definition of
guoxue is encountered in his remarks made in the “Inaugural Manifesto”
for Guoxue Quarterly: “‘Guoxue’ in our eyes is merely the abbreviation of
‘guogu’ (國故, traditional Chinese culture and learning). All of China’s cul-
tural history is our ‘guogu’; the study of the Chinese cultural history is
‘guoguxue,’ hence ‘guoxue.’” (9)
In a corrective response to the afore-mentioned broad definitions of
guoxue, scholars such as Ma Yifu (馬一浮) (10) named a much narrower
range of works for the canon of guoxue: “Here I define guoxue as the learn-
ing of liuyi [six classics]; it is comprehensive, inclusive, and profound to
bring all China’s traditional learning under the rubric of Liu yi zhi xue [the
learning of six classics].” (11) When faced with the problem of the term
guoxue, Qian Mu (錢穆), (12) one of the most influential Chinese historians
and masters of guoxue in modern China, self-consciously remarked in his
preface to Guoxue Gailun (An Outline of Guoxue), “Learning has no na-
tional boundary. The term guoxue is a contemporary coinage with no his-
tory and no future certainty. With regard to its range of coverage, what
should be included as guoxue, and what not? This is hard to determine. In
this book, which has been written as an academic textbook, I have had to
follow the model of Liang Qichao’s Qingdai xueshu gailun [Introduction to
the Scholarship of the Qing Dynasty], providing here a periodising ap-
proach to the Chinese tradition of scholarship and learning. Briefly com-
menting on each period’s scholarly and intellectual trends, it is my inten-
tion to help readers secure a good command of the itinerary of China’s
evolving learning and thought over the past 2,000 years, nurturing their
ability to make new beginnings in creatively inheriting the past.” (13) While
calling attention to the difficulty of achieving universal agreement on the
content and coverage of the concept of guoxue, Qian in his book gives the
reader to understand that he has chosen to narrow down what he means
by guoxue to xueshu sixiang (national thought learning); for the works dis-
cussed in the book are primarily sishu wujing (14) and xianqi zhuzi as well as
subsequent scholars and philosophers of different historical periods expli-
cating and appropriating them or debating with one another about them. 
Qian Mu’s conception of guoxue is shared by three other leading schol-
ars, Mou Zongshan, (15) Xu Fuguan (徐複觀), (16) and Tang Junyi, (17) for in their
co-authored 1958 manifesto on Chinese intellectual achievements and
culture they repeatedly use xueshu wenhua (學術文化), xueshu sixiang, and
lishi wenhua xueshu (歷史文化學術) to refer to what they believe consti-
tutes the spirit and itinerary of Chinese history. These three terms can be
respectively rendered into English as “intellectual culture,” “learning and
thought,” and “historical intellectual culture.” In a literal sense, it seems er-
roneous to translate wenhua xueshu into “intellectual culture,” but upon
close reading and taking into account the context in which the term ap-
pears, I believe this English translation to be closest to the Chinese origi-
nal. (18)
By now we have collected three different definitions of guoxue: 1) all the
past learning, thought, literature, and cultural legacies that have been pro-
duced in China up to the close of the nineteenth century; 2) studies of the
six classics; and 3) classical Chinese thought and learning. These mutually
conflicting yet complementary definitions of guoxue not only testify to
the unending historical debate or uncertainty regarding guoxue, but are
the seed of confusion and inconsistency surrounding the contemporary
guoxue re.
Contemporary reincarnations
The ambiguity or uncertainty attending the discourse of guoxue in the
early twentieth century has persisted into today’s guoxue movement in
China. Such ambiguity and uncertainty has much to do with the ambiguity
of Chinese modernity and Chinese self-knowledge. There are different ver-
sions of guoxue: guoxue for business people, guoxue for state officials or
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16 July 2010. 
10. Ma Yifu (1883-1967), a famous philosopher, guoxue master, and calligrapher, was a leading represen-
tative of Neo-Confucianism in modern China.
11. Ibid.
12. Qian Mu (1895-1990) was one of the leading historians and guoxue masters in modern China. Among
his most influential works are Xianqin zhuzi xinian (Biographical chronicles of pre-Qin philosophers
and scholars), Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xuexhu shi (A Chinese intellectual history of the last 300
years), Guoshi dagang (An outline of Chinese history), and Guoxue gailun (An outline of guoxue). 
13. Since its first publication in 1920, Qingdai xueshu gailun (An outline of the intellectual history of the
Qing dynasty) has always been regarded as a must for students of Chinese history. In this insightful
book, Liang Qichao makes a full investigation of the intellectual development of the Qing dynasty,
covering almost all scholars and their works pertaining to the period.
14. Sishu refers to Daxue (Great Learning), Zhongyong (The Doctrine of the Mean), Lunyu (The Analects
of Confucius), Mengzi (Mencius); Wujing (Five Classics) refers to Shangshu, Shijing (Book of Poetry), Yi-
jing, (Book of Change), Lijing (Book of Ritual), and Chunqiu (The Spring and Autumn Annals). 
15. Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909-1995), a philosopher and guoxue master, was a leading champion of Neo-
Confucianism in twentieth-century China.
16. Xu Fuguan (1904-1982) was a leading Neo-Confucianist in modern China, well-known for his original
insights into Chinese culture and art. 
17. Tang Junyi (1909-1978), philosopher and educator, was one of the leading figures of Neo-Confucianism.
18. See Mou, Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai (張君勱), “Wei zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi
xuanyan” (A manifesto on the reappraisal of Chinese culture), Wangshang dushu yuandi, 5 May 2006
(consulted on 16 July 2010).
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party cadres, guoxue for little kids in elementary school, guoxue for uni-
versity research centres or guoxue academies, guoxue for media celebri-
ties such as Yi Zhongtian (易中天) and Yu Dan (于丹) and their followers,
etc. Obviously, guoxue in such varied contemporary contexts has be-
come a loosely floating signifier severed from its signified. The tension
attending the public’s catachrestic use of guoxue has been largely in-
formed and guided, consciously or unconsciously, by the writings of con-
temporary guoxue experts. Let’s take a look, for instance, at an essay en-
titled “Lun guoxue de dangdai xingtai he dangdai yiyi” (On the Contem-
porary Forms and Meanings of Guoxue) by Yuan Xingpei (袁行霈), one of
the leading scholars on classical Chinese literature and culture and Direc-
tor of Beijing University’s Guoxue Academy. In Yuan’s article, guoxue
fluctuates between traditional Chinese learning and the research and
scholarship dealing with it. In other words, it wavers between guoxue as
a discipline of study whose object of investigation is traditional Chinese
learning and thought and guoxue as the corpus of classics of Chinese
learning. In the beginning paragraph of his article, Yuan notes, “One can
say that ‘guoxue’ refers to China’s indigenous learning and thought as
well as the scholarship dealing with traditional Chinese classics, learning,
and culture.” (19) The duplicity or ambiguity of the definition of guoxue
embraced by Yuan emblemises the persistent uncertainty of the term
throughout his article. When he remarks that guoxue emerged to meet
the new trends of thought at the turn of the twentieth century and safe-
guarded traditional Chinese culture, and when he asserts that guoxue
must carry forward splendid traditional Chinese culture, and that there is
an urgent need for a new guoxue, obviously what guoxue means is the
discipline of study investigating traditional Chinese thought and learning
instead of the object of the study. On the other hand, guoxue in Yuan’s
article also refers to the collection of traditional Chinese classics. When
he quotes Deng Shi and Huang Jie creating Guocui xuebao to investigate
guoxue and preserve guocui, and when he cites Zhang Taiyan’s cate-
gorisating of guoxue into xiaoxue (philology), jingxue (the study of six
classics), shixue (history), zhuzi (pre-Qin masters), and wenxue (litera-
ture), the term unmistakably refers to traditional learning and classics
that the discipline of study called guoxue takes as the object of investi-
gation. Another ambiguity in Yuan is his conflation of guoxue and tradi-
tional culture after he defines the former as the core values and assump-
tions underwriting the latter. (20)
If Yuan Xingpei’s conception of guoxue is confusing and misleading, then
a more aggravated version of ambiguity or ambivalence is encountered in
Zhang Rulun (張汝倫), another leading guoxue scholar in contemporary
China. In his intervention, (21) Zhang raises the status of guoxue to the alti-
tude of universal significance and validity while emphasising the indigene-
ity of it and turning guoxue into a Chinese equivalent for American Stud-
ies. (22) In introducing this confusion, Zhang only manages to cast doubt on
himself as a well-informed and trustworthy scholar. There is a double in-
congruence between American Studies and guoxue: first, American Studies
was founded at a moment when the US was emerging as a global power
with increasing influence upon the world, whereas guoxue was born as
China was being reduced to the status of a semi-colonised country, its tra-
ditional culture being superseded by invading modern Western culture, al-
though both were propelled by an unmistakable ethnocentrism. Second,
while guoxue refers to a corpus of cultural and scholarly classics produced
during a span of over 3,000 years up to the end of the Qing dynasty, the
term American Studies designates a discipline of scholarly and critical in-
quiry whose generic and historical frontiers keep shifting to include the lat-
est cultural productions. Since the 1960s and 1970s, American Studies has
reinvented itself, shifting its focus to issues of race, ethnicity, gender, sex-
uality, immigration, and transnational concerns. In grandiosely asserting
universality with excessive fervour, Zhang Rulun seems to risk a strong
danger of falling into some kind of logical inconsistency and sinocentric ar-
rogance that ultimately undermines the cause he intends to promote.
Some of Zhang’s expressions confirm that advocates of guoxue, as under-
lined by Arif Dirlik, could easily be trapped in a parochial sinocentrism, es-
pecially if they do not open up enough to other non-Western cultural lega-
cies in seeking possibilities of alternative modernity. (23) To any informed
reader, Zhang’s sinocentric celebration of the universal value of guoxue
registers the larger context of contemporary debate on universalism be-
tween two opposed camps in China. One camp advocates freedom, equal-
ity, democracy, and human rights as universal values, and in their view, to
strive for these values is to prevent the state’s complete control over a na-
tion’s economic, political, cultural, and social life. As such these values
should be in no way compromised or sacrificed in the name of safeguard-
ing national characteristics. (24) The other camp, to which belongs Zhang
Rulun himself, questions and rejects these values as Eurocentric or West-
centric, for they are West-authored and West-authorised, and in their ide-
ological deployment have been instrumental in serving Western territorial
and economic expansionism. Instead, members of this latter camp assert
the Chinese concept of hexie (和諧, harmony or social harmony) as a truly
universal value, which in their view subsumes or implies all of the afore-
mentioned Western values. (25) These two positions, though apparently op-
posed to each other, can be taken as flip sides of the same coin, for both
endorse universalism – it is just that the values universalised are different.
What both neglect is that thoughts and values are place-related, (26) that
the concept of universality has culture-specific articulations, and that uni-
versal values migrating across cultural borders have to undergo revision or
modification. (27)
If guoxue in Yuan Xingpei and Zhang Rulun respectively is a concept
loaded with ambiguity and sinocentrism, then it becomes a magical word
for other scholars. In his article entitled “Jianli makesi zhuyi xin guoxue
guan he xin guoxue tixi” (Creating a Marxist New Guoxue Theory and Sys-
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Social Sciences), 22 July 2008, consulted on 16 July 2010.
20. The notion of guoxue as core values and thoughts underpinning Chinese cultural practices is a key the-
sis argued in Qian Mu’s Guoxue gailun (An outline of national learning), Beijing, The Commercial Press,
1997; and Zhongguo wenhua shi daolun (An introduction to the history of Chinese culture), Beijing,
The Commercial Press, 1994.
21. Zhang Rulun, “Guoxue yu dangdai shijie” (Guoxue and the contemporary world), Wenhuibao, 23 June
2008 (consulted on 17 July 2010).
22. “American Studies,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 13 October 2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/American_studies, consulted on 28 September 2010.
23. See Footnote 1. Dirlik’s essay is included in the present issue as well.
24. See Du Guang, “Pushi jiazhi: yige shidaxing de zhongda keti,” (Universal values: An epochal project), 25
October 2010 (consulted on 21 November 2010); see also “Pushi jiazhi he zhongguo tese,” (Universal
Values and Chinese Characteristics), 27 July 2010 (consulted on 21 November 2010).
25. See Yu Dunkang, “Xunzhao zhongguo wenhua zhong de pushi jiazhi,” (In search of universal values in Chi-
nese culture), 9 October 2009 (consulted on 21 November 2010); Zhang, Weiwei, “Shui chuangzao le ren-
lei de pushi jiazhi?” (Who has created universal values?), 1 July 2009 (consulted on 21 November 2010).
26. See Chakarabarty Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, xviii.
27. For more discussion on this topic, see Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal and the Limits of Formal-
ism,” in Butler, Laclau, and Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogue on the
Left, London and New York, Verso, 2000, pp. 11-43.
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tem), (28) for instance, Li Shenming (李慎明), vice president of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, notes, “The purpose of advocating guoxue in
contemporary China is to carry forward the excellent cultural traditions of
the various nationalities in China, to complete the sinicisation of Marxism,
to facilitate development of a systematic theory of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, to accomplish the historic task of rejuvenating China, to
further reinforce the integrative unity of Chinese culture, to maintain the
ideological basis of the solidarity of Chinese communities all over the
world and their inseparable connection, to enhance the cultural exchange
and cooperation between the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
with a view to expediting the reunification of China, to help satisfy the de-
sire of other peoples of the world to understand China, to introduce tradi-
tional Chinese culture to the world, and to quicken the process of popular-
ising outstanding Chinese culture in different parts of the world.” (29) In the
space of this over-stretched, lengthy sentence, one encounters some mag-
ical metamorphoses: Guoxue acquires an all-purpose usefulness and serves
China’s every state project. What Li’s statement on guoxue betrays is an
imploding ambiguity or incongruity of the term as well as his anxiety to
turn guoxue into an instrument serving state interests. The same grandilo-
quent tone is detected in another scholar’s similar assessment of guoxue:
Relaunching and reconstructing guoxue today, in his view, is of enormous
importance in building a socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. It
helps to articulate Chinese cultural subjectivity, facilitates China’s national
renaissance, reinvigorates Chinese culture, and reasserts its beauty. (30)
Coinciding with such grandiloquent conceptual ambiguity of guoxue in
academia are the numerous confusing uses it has been put to in the cul-
ture and commodity market of contemporary China. Even a casual cata-
logue of scenes and signs of the contemporary Chinese cultural landscape
or market would lead to reflections on the imploding ambiguity of guoxue
and the motivations behind it. All or at least most of the leading universi-
ties in China are running guoxue institutes or guoxue training classes, some
of which are designed particularly for CEOs. There are all kinds of televised
guoxue lectures forums, and a fairly large horde of emerging guoxue “mas-
ters” headed by Yu Dan, Yi Zhongtian, Fu Peirong, He Yizhou, Chen Zhaojie,
Zhang Qicheng, and Qian Wenzhong, to name only a few, who have be-
come media celebrities with large followings for their televised guoxue lec-
tures on Zhuang Zi, Lunyu, Sanguo (Romance of Three kingdoms), Sanzijing
(Three-Character Reader for Young Children), Hongloumeng (Dream of the
Red Chamber), Xiyouji (A Journey to the West), and Yijing (Book of
Change). In some provinces elementary school kids are made to memorise
the Sanzijing while wearing pre-modern scholarly costumes, and book-
stores are saturated with all kinds of books on the relationship between
guoxue and administrative or managerial skills, enterprises, and careers.
Let’s take a look at the CEO guoxue seminars offered by a number of in-
ternationally known universities: Guoxue Academy at Renmin University of
China (People’s University of China) offered a doctoral seminar for Govern-
ment and Business Leaders in 2009, covering subjects from sishu wujing to
all kinds of ancient classics in the domains of history, medicine, art, litera-
ture, poetics, and religion. Peking University’s Guoxue Academy in 2010
designed seminars on fengshui (風水, geomancy), zhanbu (占卜, augury),
and government stratagems. Chinese Confucian Business Guoxue Academy
earlier this year ran a guoxue seminar for CEOs and government depart-
ment heads. Fudan University offered a CEO Guoxue Seminar in August
2010 covering sishu wujing, Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, and Sun Zi’s Art of War. (31)
At the same time there are also entrepreneurial guoxue forums organised by
big enterprises. For instance, in June 2010 Fujian Daimler Automotive Co.,
Ltd. co-sponsored China’s Entrepreneurial Guoxue Forum with the magazine
Chinese Entrepreneur discussing the contribution of guoxue to green ecoen-
vironment and the harmonious relationship among heaven, earth, humanity,
and myriad things. In large cities such as Chongqing , Chengdu, Wuhan, Bei-
jing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Nanning, Jinan, and Xiamen, guoxue is becoming
a subject for elementary school kids. Small children not only recite Sanzijing,
Lunyu, Xiaojing (On Filial Piety), and Dizigui (The Book of Principles and
Rules for Children), but also practice meditation and qigong in Han-style
clothes. 
In CEO guoxue seminars offered by universities, guoxue is used as the
source or treasury of wisdom, business stratagems, ethical codes of busi-
ness behaviour, guides for personal fulfilment, keys to inner peace, and
principles and techniques of moral cultivation. This is precisely what the
business community embraces and is eager to buy, regardless of whether
the offered guoxue seminars are able to achieve their projected goals or
whether the thoughts and views of guoxue classics can actually meet
those desires in a world centuries away from the world in which the
guoxue classics as well as those thoughts and views were born and prac-
ticed. While business stratagems and personal fulfilment are at the top of
the above-mentioned list of values, the rest are really felt needs in the con-
temporary Chinese business community as well. Not only does inner peace
relate to personal fulfilment, but wisdom, business ethics, and character
cultivation also contribute to it, for according to Chinese cultural tradition,
the primary qualities of a highly esteemed and socially recognised success-
ful businessman are transcendental wisdom, moral integrity, and adhesion
to ethical principles, hence the name or concept of rushang (儒商) – an in-
tellectual businessman well trained in guoxue or Confucian (the often
camouflaged identification between the two terms will be taken up later
in the essay) thoughts and values. Rushang refers to the kind of business-
man who is not only well educated, wise, and knowledgeable, but whose
behaviour is defined by ren, yi, li, zhi, xin. (32) As the image of rushang in Chi-
nese cultural imagining always recalls those winning qualities, it is a hot
commodity among business people in China today. The tacit consensus
among business people is that to be a rich man is a small success; to be a
great success is to become a social or media celebrity, but to reach this
grand goal money is not everything, and social, cultural, and moral trap-
pings are more important. This is partly why and how there is a growing
market demand for guoxue works and guoxue seminars, for these works
and seminars can bring businessmen these necessary trappings. The prime
push behind the burgeoning market is, of course, the marketisation and
commodification of education in contemporary China, which drives people
to seek commercial resources from all times and places past and present,
transforming everything with cultural or historic value into a commodity.
What makes one pause in the face of this growing market is that guoxue
is not only made to serve the business world or the world of capital, but
seems to be manipulated to accommodate every need or desire of the Chi-
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nese. Such mystification of guoxue reaches a pinnacle in titles of publica-
tions such as Guoxue zhong de guanli zhihui (Managerial Wisdom in
Guoxue), Guoxue yu rensheng (Guoxue and Living), Dangyuan lingdao
ganbu ershi tang guoxue xiuyang ke (Twenty Guoxue Lectures on Charac-
ter Cultivation for Party Leaders).
If the incongruent definitions of guoxue have effected irresolvable ambi-
guity, then the stretched use and imploding ambiguity of the concept de-
ployed in contemporary China’s culture and education market are pushing
the concept to a crisis. When something becomes everything and serves
every interest, it turns into nothing and no longer has any real use.
Guoxue as ideology: The past and its present
If the kaleidoscopic vertiginous guoxue landscape depicted above tends
to reduce guoxue to an empty signifier, a closer look into its various uses
will unmask the concealed symbolic and ideological significance and func-
tions behind the guoxue fever. First, the return of guoxue in contemporary
China coincides with the veiled capitulation of the Chinese regime to cap-
italism, and as such it serves an overall ideological project for the ambigu-
ous modernity PRC champions; second, the logic of capital or the desire for
profit is propelling the transformation of everything, past and present, ma-
terial and immaterial, into a commodity, and the guoxue fever is major site
of such commodification. Third, the academic sector of Chinese society
has forfeited its right and ability to act as its intellectual and cultural guide,
and what exists between Chinese academia and the political regime is col-
laboration or collusion rather than critical confrontation. Here arises the
fundamental difference between Guoxue Studies conceived and practiced
a century ago and at the turn of the twenty-first century. For, in its inau-
gural moment, not only was guoxue advocated and practiced by those
who, well trained in guoxue and genuinely concerned and committed to
promoting traditional Chinese learning, championed the sincere efforts to
safeguard the core values of Chinese culture against the threat of the
hegemonic Western learning instead of treating guoxue works as sign val-
ues and commodities as many of the “guoxue masters” are doing today,
but the pioneers of Guoxue Studies were independent critical intellectuals,
or what Edward Said calls public intellectuals. (33) There is no doubt a con-
tinuity between the guoxue movement at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but that continuity
consists more of shared ambiguity than of shared anxieties about the
preservation or survival of traditional Chinese learning, or of any shared
conscience and responsibility pertaining to the figure of the public intel-
lectual.
When the guoxue pioneers such as Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, and Liang
Shuming were advocating guoxue, the whole nation was seized by worries
and anxieties about the country’s national and cultural survival in a new
world dominated by the West-led and West-defined capitalist modernity
that, predicated on free-market economy, Western rationalisation, and
Western parliamentary democracy, was “batter[ing] down all Chinese
walls,” “compel[ling] all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bour-
geois mode of production.” (34) This is the moment of what Michael Valdez
Moses calls an “irreversible” “homogenizing worldwide process of modern-
ization” (35) that had been newly set in motion, and which, in the name of
progress, was threatening to conquer worldwide social communities and
cultural modes of production that stood as “distinct,” “legitimate,” and “al-
ternative” to modern society, heterogeneous possibilities of organising
human society, different ways of gratifying individual desires and ambitions
or of “being-in-the-world,” and divergent systems of beliefs, mores, and val-
ues that are “radically different from those that have come to prevail in the
twentieth century.” (36) Meanwhile, China had by then been repeatedly hu-
miliated by its defeat at war with Western powers and Japan, and many of
the Chinese intellectuals or official-scholars had become convinced that in
order to emulate and ultimately rival the West, China had to be Westernised
– what one could call a strategic Westernisation, rejecting its own cultural
past. 
It is misleading to see the return of guoxue in China today as indicative
of similar sentiments and anxieties about national and cultural survival. To
illustrate this point, let’s take a look at the historical context for the revival
of guoxue in contemporary China. First, the economic successes of Japan
and the four Asian mini-dragons have given rise to a global discourse and
a socio-political imaginary of Confucian capitalism, which seems to chal-
lenge the world’s established ideas of the tradition-modernity relationship.
Second, a transcontinental group of Confucianist scholars has given rise to
a School of New Confucianism and a theory of Cultural China, both of
which not only contribute enormously to articulating East Asian or Confu-
cian values “such as sympathy, distributive justice, duty-consciousness, rit-
ual, public-spiritedness, and group orientation,” but also to spreading the
notion that modernity “may assume different cultural forms” and that all
indigenous cultural traditions “throughout the world have the potential to
develop their own alternatives to Western modernism.” (37) Third, China is
rising as a global economic power with an astonishing record of continu-
ous GDP increases in the midst of economic recession in the rest of the
world. All of these factors contribute to reviving world-wide interest in
Confucian culture, and seem to convince many world leaders in govern-
ment, political science, sociology, and cultural studies that Confucian val-
ues and cultural legacies offer potential opportunities for reinventing cap-
italist modernity. These factors also combine to reawaken the Chinese in
China to the utilitarian importance of Confucian values. In other words,
China’s contemporary revival of interest in guoxue is motivated less by
worries and anxieties about national survival and rejuvenation than by
self-congratulatory feelings of national pride and narcissism.
It is very significant that guoxue made its first come-back gesture in
China at a moment when the world was celebrating Confucian capitalism,
and when it was universally proclaimed that socialism had become totally
bankrupt and that History was reaching its end in global capitalism. The
first official signal of guoxue’s re-inauguration or return was a long article
titled “Guoxue qiaoqiao zoujin beida xiaoyuan” (Guoxue is Quietly Coming
Back to the Campus of Peking University), which was carried in the 16 Au-
gust 1993 edition of The People’s Daily; less than two months later,
Guangming Daily published an article entitled “Guoxue he guoxue dashi de
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meili” (The Charm of Guoxue and Guoxue Masters). (38) It seems superfluous
to point out that The People’s Daily and Guangming Daily are the two top
official newspapers in China, and that whatever appears in them has to be
approved by the Communist Party and represents the Party’s will. These two
publications can be taken as marking the official re-inauguration of guoxue
in China. Viewed in such a historical context, one can argue, the advocacy
of guoxue can be taken as a Dengist gesture of saying yes to Confucian cap-
italism. Actually, his formulation of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,”
which is a rerun of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics,” can be read as
a PRC version of “Confucian capitalism,” because both of them involve a hy-
brid of tradition and modernity, and because Chinese characteristics are
Confucian values renamed. Such close affinity between Confucian capital-
ism and socialism with Chinese characteristics becomes more obvious with
the Party’s call for “harmonious society” today, for at the core of Confucian
values is the ideal of harmonious society. Indeed, guoxue is in actuality used
as a catachrestic stand-in for Confucian values. From its first reappearance
in contemporary China to its various conceptions among contemporary
guoxue scholars as well as in the media and culture market, one can argue
that guoxue actually refers to Confucian values and legacies without nam-
ing them. If, according to Yuan Xingpei, Zhang Rulun, Li Shenming, and Ji
Baocheng (紀寶成) respectively, the essence of guoxue consists in its ability
to enrich our spiritual world, to reinforce China’s social cohesion and na-
tional unity, to open up ways of worlding alternative to those prescribed by
capitalist modernity, and to maintain the solidarity of the Greater Cultural
China, then the spectre of guoxue is none other than Confucianistic in
essence. As universally acknowledged, Qian Mu is one of the most influen-
tial scholars on classical Chinese learning, and one of the few in the twen-
tieth century deserving the title of guoxue master. What he indefatigably
did all his life was, according to his disciple Yu Yingshi (余英時) and many
others, to call back the spirit of guguo (故國, the lost China). (39) Actually one
can say that what Qian Mu devoted his whole life to doing was calling back
the spirit of guogu (classical Chinese learning). And in Qian’s estimate, what
threads through the whole corpus of Chinese classical learning is Confucian-
ism, a thesis argued in almost all his works. (40) What he writes in Zhongguo
shixue fawei (Essays on Chinese Historiography) is particularly illuminating
here: Confucius stands as a central point in the 5,000-year Chinese history,
creatively inheriting Chinese cultural traditions of the first 2,500 years and
ushering in a Chinese whole way of living for the following 2,500 years. (41)
The difference between Qian and the contemporary guoxue scholars dis-
cussed earlier is that what Qian explicitly points out is only ambiguously or
equivocally implied by them. 
An ambiguous modernity 
In his 2008 book In Defense of Lost Causes, Slavoj Zizek notes that China
is the world’s “ideal capitalist state” today, and that “as the emerging super-
power of the twenty-first century [it] seems to embody a new kind of capi-
talism: disregard for ecological consequences, disdain for workers’ rights,
everything subordinated to the ruthless drive to develop and become the
new world force.” (42) “In order to curb the excess of social disintegration
caused by the capitalist explosion,” Zizek continues, “Chinese officials cele-
brate religions and traditional ideologies which sustain social stability, from
Buddhism to Confucianism, that is, the very ideologies that were the target
of the Cultural Revolution.” (43) In his view, every cultural or theoretical legacy,
from Confucianism to Marxism, is being mobilised by the Chinese govern-
ment to “legitimize the present Chinese state interest of maintaining Com-
munist Party power and thus guaranteeing stability in a period of fast-mov-
ing economic development.” (44) What Zizek sees in China today, one can
argue, is an imploding ambiguity of modernisation or modernity champi-
oned by the CCP leadership. Capitalism, Marxism, Confucianism, economism
or developmentalism, and harmonious society, these contradictory terms
constitute the parameters of the present phase of Chinese modernity. 
The uncertainty attending “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and
“socialist market economy” has triggered much heated debate on China’s
economic reform in China and overseas. “Socialist market economy” signi-
fies a hybrid economy, while “socialism with Chinese characteristics” tends
to reconcile two social systems apparently opposed to each other. Socialist
market economy as practiced in China threatens to break down the bound-
ary between capitalism and socialism. The defining hallmark of the PRC
project of modernity is its ambiguity, and that is why world-renowned
economists and sociologists such as Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi have
noted in different contexts that socialism is not completely gone nor is cap-
italism fully established in China. (45) However, the “theoretical ambiguity or
uncertainty concerning contemporary Chinese socio-economic life does
not preclude a much less ambiguous empirical reality”:
China’s phenomenal advance in economic development is creating
a yawning gap between poor and rich, country and city, throwing
the country into confusion and chaos at different levels of social
life. The past 15 years or so have witnessed unprecedented rates of
unemployment, disintegration of medical care and social welfare,
institution of market economy at the cost of the principles of equal-
ity and social justice, emergence of an indigenous capitalist class,
and a corrupt officialdom colluding with national and transnational
capitalists. The nationwide redistribution of public property once
again pushes the workers and peasantry to the margins of society.
Urban space in China is being quickly modernized at the cost of the
peasantry, which is politically the most deprived and economically
the most exploited sector of the population. The whole country is
dominated by the logic of capital, the desire for profit, and the com-
modified structure of consciousness. (46)
Zizek is precisely correct that it is in order “to curb the excess of social
disintegration caused by the capitalist explosion” that the present Chinese
government is recruiting and mobilising all kinds of religious, ideological,
and cultural resources. It is in such a context that guoxue is returning to
the Chinese cultural imagination and market. What the Chinese state
think-tank really intends to recruit or resuscitate of guoxue or traditional
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values and learning are primarily Confucian values such as social stability,
harmonious interpersonal relations, collectivism, and self-cultivation. The
green light granted to guoxue by the state is translated by the cultural, the
educational, and the media market into “Anything goes.” All those semi-
nars, forums, school programs, televised lectures, and publications on
guoxue, as hot commodities, are designed and manufactured to satisfy all
kinds of desires: To make profit, to issue a certificate for proper moral con-
duct, to make a gesture of patriotism or nationalism, to offer a simulacrum
of traditional culture, or to add a human face to capital. In all these pur-
suits, one sees an unmistakable collusion among Chinese academia, the
market, and the ruling regime: what is at stake is a kind of simulacrum of
something long lost, which is desired by state-officials, designed by aca-
demics, and produced by market promoters. If all these pursuits or per-
formances, by the state-market-academia trinity, only signal the absence
of what they are about, then, one can argue, they nonetheless obliquely re-
flect the presence of something underpinning the present Chinese society,
an innermost nostalgic yearning among the Chinese for what is long lost
– the Confucian values such as unity between Heaven and humanity,
human-relatedness, social cohesion and harmonious interpersonal rela-
tions, and familial and societal solidarity prioritised over economic devel-
opment. Such a cultural nostalgia for a long-lost past in the depths of or-
dinary people’s minds is less an irrational insistence on going back in time
than an effect of the Lacanian logic of lack. What triggers the desire for
something is its absence. If Chinese state think-tanks, the commodity mar-
ket, and academia are capitalising with a vengeance on such traditional
values, it is mainly because they are cherished by the ordinary people. The
only way any political regime can secure or maintain the people’s support
is by making believe that they are acting on their will; in much the same
way, the only way the market can sell commodities successfully is by pre-
tending that it is selling in the consumers’ interest.
What Dipesh Chakrabarty writes in Habitations of Modernity about the
politicians’ use of khadi in India has particular bearing on the present discus-
sion. (47) Khadi is coarse, homespun cotton cloth that Ghandi wore and pop-
ularised in the 1920s. “The whiteness of khadi symbolizes the Hindu idea of
purity (lack of blemish, pollution),” Chakrabarty explains, “its coarseness an
identification with both simplicity and poverty; together, they stand for the
politician’s capacity to renounce his own material well-being, to make sac-
rifices (tyag) in the public/national interest. Khadi indicates the person’s ca-
pacity to serve the country.” (48) After introducing the historical origins and
socio-political symbolic significance of khadi or, more precisely, the wearing
of it, Chakrabarty proceeds to relate that given the rampant official corrup-
tion in India, the use of khadi by politicians has lost its previous Ghandian
significance and only betrays politicians’ hypocrisy. What is shockingly fasci-
nating and enlightening, however, is that, after speaking about politicians’
hypocrisy, Chakrabarty makes another turn of the screw and argues that the
use of khadi in contemporary India speaks of the fact that Indians still be-
lieve in the values symbolised by khadi, the values advocated by Ghandi. That
is, although the politicians are corrupt despite their wearing of khadi, they as
well as the Indian people still, though unconsciously, hold on to the values
and virtues championed by Ghandi. The wearing of khadi indicates the un-
conscious or unintended desire for what khadi symbolised in Ghandi’s time
– honesty and dedication to serving the country. If and when the Indians es-
chew khadi and Indian politicians no longer care to wear it, that would “sig-
nify the demise of a deeper structure of desire and would signify India’s
complete integration into the circuits of global capital.” (49)
In much the same way, although the Confucian or traditional values and
virtues as capitalised by the state government, the academic elite, and the
commodity market in contemporary China only ironically mirror their ab-
sence among their advocates and the hypocrisy on the part of state offi-
cials and market promoters, the celebration of those values by the state-
market-academia trinity nevertheless speaks to the fact that the Chinese
still believe in those values and virtues. It points to an innermost desire in
the national unconscious for a different genuinely existing social order, and
for other ways of being human than those defined by capitalist modernity.
If and when the Chinese reject those Confucian values and Chinese politi-
cians no longer make a point of advocating them, that will signal China’s
complete integration into capitalist modernity. 
China today is an exemplary place for the nonsynchronic co-existence of
different temporalities and different cultural practices. In other words, it is
a layered society defined by what Raymond Williams terms different
modes of culture – dominant, emerging, and residual. (50) As a nation with
a long history and a rich cultural heritage, whose entry into modernity was
forced by the West and as such always evokes feelings of humiliation suf-
fered by the Chinese at their defeat in war with Western powers (in a sense
Japan counts as a Western power as well), China has always reacted to
West-inaugurated and West-dominated modernity with a mind torn be-
tween emulating the Western Other and keeping its own cultural charac-
teristics in constructing its own mode of modernity. This is a structure of
feeling, to borrow a term from Williams again, that has been and remains
to be shared by most of the Chinese. It is such a nationally shared persist-
ent ambivalence towards tradition and modernity, or towards capitalist
globalisation, that has been constantly manipulated by the Chinese gov-
ernment in deploying Confucian values to legitimise its authoritarian rule
and in using the rhetoric of development to rationalise the present when
the nation is threatened by increasing social stability. This is how and why
everything there seems to have an aura of ambiguity, from common cul-
tural gestures, to educational programs, to media images. 
Guoxue is no exception to the rule. However, despite all its irresolvable
ambiguity and the various uses to which it has been put, there is some-
thing crystal clear about guoxue: It has always been recalled from the past
to serve a certain need in the present. It is oftentimes a moment of cat-
achresis, but the catachresis points to something that refuses to die – the
nostalgic desire in the national unconscious for some long-lost values and
virtues, imagined or lived – and because of that, Chinese modernity may
never be the same as the modernity outside its borders, at least not in the
foreseeable future. It is in this sense that to separate the discussion of
guoxue from the context of Chinese modernity, or to divorce the ambigu-
ity of guoxue from the ambiguity of Chinese modernity, is to miss the
whole point.
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